Abstract. In cases where legislators represent districts that vary in population, the design of fair legislative voting rules requires an understanding of how the number of votes cast by a legislator is related to a measure of her influence over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting, each based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyperellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose-Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.
Introduction: Simple games and weighted voting
In yes-no voting several players vote for or against a proposal. Collective approval or disapproval is then determined by some decision rule, as modelled by a simple game G = (N, W). Here N is a finite set of players (voters), and W is a collection of subsets of N that is monotonic: whenever C ∈ W and C ⊆ D, D ∈ W. If a vote is taken, C is the resulting set of yes-voters, and the rule specifies collective approval then C is a winning coalition and we place C ∈ W; if it specifies disapproval then C is a losing coalition and C ∈ L, W's complement.
Example 1 (Mathematics Department) Professors R and B cast 1 vote each, Professor G (the Department's Chair) casts 2 votes, and approval of a proposal requires a minimum of 3 votes in favor. The associated simple game is G M ath = (N, W) = ({R, B, G}, {{R, G}, {B, G}, {R, B, G}}). This is an example of a weighted voting rule, and G M ath is a weighted simple game (defined below) with voting weights w R = w B = 1, w G = 2, and quota 3. Definition 1.1. A simple game G = (N, W) for which N = {1, 2, . . . n} is weighted if there exists a vector of real number voting weights w = (w 1 , . . . w n ) together with a real number quota q such that a coalition C is winning precisely when the total weight w(C) = i∈C w i of its members meets or exceeds quota. In this case, we say that w and q jointly realize G as a weighted game.
We'll use [q; w 1 , w 2 . . . , w n ] to specify weights and quota that realize a weighted game. Note that one can tell whether a game is weighted without referring to a quota -if w(C) > w(C ) holds for each pair C ∈ W, C / ∈ W, then some quota can always be inserted between the weight of the heaviest losing coalition and that of the lightest winning coalition.
Example 2 (Two couples on vacation together) The Romans a and b and the Greeks γ and δ agree that any proposed detour from their planned vacation route requires approval of at least one person from each couple.
The corresponding game G Couple is nonweighted, for if the two winning coalitions C 1 = {a, δ} and C 2 = {γ, b} swap δ for b, the resulting coalitions C 1 = {a, b} and C 2 = {γ, δ} are both losing. Yet every weighted game is swap robust -a one-for-one trade between two winning coalitions must leave at least one of them still winning. This is because any such exchange that lowers C 1 's total weight must raise C 2 's total by a corresponding amount.
Swap robustness is necessary for weightedness, but something stronger is needed for a full characterization. Several such characterizations appear in the literature, including asummability [9] , the greater-than-half property [8] , and trade robustness [27] . These properties form a related family, the geometric member of which is the separating hyperplanes characterization discussed in Sec. 3 (see [29] for a fuller discussion of this family).
The characterizations we introduce here seem entirely different. The geometric member of this new clan uses separating hyper-ellipsoids that are "aligned" -obtained by stretching a hypershere along each coordinate axis. Moreover, these stretch factors embody an unsuspected relationship between voting weight and influence, as measured by the Penrose-Banzhaf index of voting power.
Barthelemé and Monjardet [2] pioneered the application to voting theory of the two-step method we use for the characterization via ellipsoids -first convert Hamming distance to squared Euclidean distance in the hypercube, and then apply Huyghens' theorem on the mean. It has also been exploited in [30] , [31] , and [4] . This approach has the potential to transform any result that entails minimizing a sum of Hamming distances, and deserves to be better known.
Weight VS Influence: Penrose-Banzhaf voting power
Interest in the theory of weighted voting has been sparked by its history as a real voting method. John Banzhaf's seminal 1965 article, "Weighted voting doesn't work" [1] originated as a critique of a draft written by one of his professors, made while he was a student at Columbia Law School. 1 In the period 1962 − 1964 the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a series of decisions that established a precedent favoring the one person, one vote principle. Several states had been using voting districts of greatly varying population size; the court struck down these rules, on the grounds that the influence of an individual vote might depend heavily on the district within which it was cast. The professor's draft argued that one way to implement the court's principle (short of continually redrawing district lines so as to equalize district populations) would be to use weighted voting, with each representative given a voting weight proportional to the population of her district.
Banzhaf saw a flaw in this reasoning. Voting weight can be wildly disproportionate to influence. For example [51; 49, 49, 2] and [2; 1, 1, 1] represent the same voting rule -majority rule for 3 voters. Yet voter 1 cannot have 24.5 times as much influence as voter 3 and simultaneously have the same influence . . . at least one of these weight vectors must misrepresent influence.
2 Our reasoning here contains an implicit assumption that a voter's "influence" can be meaningfully measured by a single number, but otherwise does not turn on any precise definition of "influence," resting instead on wiggle room -the sometimes considerable extent to which voting weights can vary while representing the same game. 3 However, a precise definition seems necessary if we wish to address two related issues: QUESTION 1 "Is there always some choice of voting weights that perfectly reflects influence?" QUESTION 2 "How can we choose voting weights for legislators in a representative assembly so that they appropriately reflect population differences among the districts represented?" 4 So, how should we measure the influence of a voter in a simple game? In [1] , Banzhaf argues that we should count instances in which a voter is critical or decisive, swinging the outcome of the collective decision. The resulting index (defined below) has come to be known as Banzhaf voting power. However, in 1946 the statistician Lionel Penrose had proposed the identical measure in an article [24] that did not attract much attention at the time. Penrose's work was later pointed out by Morriss [23] , then by Felsenthal and Machover [10] , and later by others.
∈ W}, W notcrit i denotes {C ∈ W i | C − {i} ∈ W}, and η i = |W crit i | -the raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting power of i -counts the number of winning coalitions in which voter i is critical.
The following lemma provides one of several well-known, equivalent expressions for η i . The proof follows immediately from the bijection between the sets W notcrit i and W ¬i given by C → C \ {i}. Lemma 2.2. Let G = (N, W) be a simple game, with i ∈ N . Then η i = |W i | − |W ¬i |. 2 In this particular example it is easy to see that the three voters play symmetric roles; every permutation of N is an automorphism of the simple game, and so one can argue that any reasonable measure of influence should assign equal amounts to the three voters. The example roughly models the situation prevailing in the Israeli Knesset during the late 1980s. Both Labor and Likud held large blocs of seats, but neither could form a ruling (majority) coalition without cutting deals with some small ultra-orthodox religious parties. These small parties wielded considerable bargaining power in the negotiations. The resulting controversy helped drive a change in Israel's parliamentary system to one in which the prime minister was elected by direct popular vote (see [3] ), but that change was abolished in 2001.
3 One alternatives is to measure influence with an interval of numbers; see [28] . 4 By "appropriately reflect population differences" we do not necessarily mean directly in proportion to population. If we view such a representative assembly as a two-tier voting rule in which individual citizens, when they elect their representatives, are in effect voting on the legislation itself, then there is an argument (which goes back to the original articles of Penrose and Banzhaf) that equalizing the influence of these citizens requires the voting powers of representatives to be in proportion to the square roots of their district populations.
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It is typical to divide the raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting power η i by 2 n−1 (which allows a probabilistic interpretation 5 ) or by n i=1 η i (to normalize, although this approach has been sharply criticized). However, we'll be concerned only with the relative proportions of voting power among the voters, so we'll identify η i itself with i's Penrose-Banzhaf voting power.
The measure of Penrose and Banzhaf is not the only one possible, nor even the first to attract widespread attention -that distinction belongs to the alternative approach of Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik [26] . Our exclusive focus, in this paper, on Penrose-Banzhaf voting power is due to the role that it plays in the theorems of sections 4 and 6, rather than any inclination to carry a spear for either side in the voting power wars.
Before [1] even appeared, Banzhaf learned of a weighted voting case that was to be heard by the the New York Court of Appeals, involving weighted voting systems proposed in Washington and Saratoga counties, which would have used voting weights proportional to population. Banzhaf submitted an amicus curae brief, which included the galley proofs of his article. The court found Banzhaf's reasoning to be compelling, judging the proposed rules to be unconstitutional and referring to Banzhaf's work in their decision.
One might think that Saratoga's fate had settled the issue, at least for counties within New York State. But recent events show that not to be the case. The county of Schenectady adjoins that of Saratoga, lying just to its south. 6 On May 10, 2011, the 15-person Schenectady County Legislature voted to change from the then current "one-legislator-one-vote" rule, to a weighted rule (effective in 2012), in which the voting weights range from a low of 0.9048 to a high of 1.0799. These weights add to 15 and are chosen to be proportional, based on the 2010 Census, to the population share of each representative (equal to the district population divided by the number of representatives from that district, with 4 districts and from 3 to 5 representatives per district). Population shifts had forced some change to the old system, because the variance among population shares would otherwise have exceeded a state-mandated cap.
However, with the new weights, the heaviest 7 legislators have a total weight of 7.4052 (less than half of 15), while the lightest 8 weigh 7.5948. Most issues use weighted majority rule; that is, the quota is 7.5 (or 7.5001 -with these weights, it doesn't matter). Thus, although the new system presumably satisfies the state mandate and the old one would have violated it, the two systems are identical for such issues, with all legislators having equal influence. Certain budgetary matters, however, require a two-thirds (weighted) majority for approval, and here the story is quite different. With a quota of 10 the effect of the newly-approved weights is substantial; the heaviest legislator has a bit more than 19% more voting weight (or population-share) than the lightest, but has almost 77% more Penrose-Banzhaf voting power! A recent series of expansions of the European Union has also played a role in inspiring research on voting power ( [11] , [15] , [16] , [18] , and [19] are a sample). The 5 Consider the probability distribution p that assigns equal probability to every coalition D of N \ {i}. Then η i 2 n−1 is the probability that D is losing and D ∪ {i} is winning. We can obtain p by assuming that each voter independently tosses a fair coin to decide whether to vote "yes" or "no."
6 Union College (the home institution of one of the authors of the paper you are now reading) lies in Schenectady County.
EU's Council of Ministers has used weighted voting (as well as more complex rules that incorporate a weighted-voting component); each such expansion results in a sometimes spirited debate over changes to the previous voting weights. Before moving on, it seems appropriate to situate the role of this paper within the context limned by the questions posed at the start of this section. For Question 1, as applied to either of the two particular power indices mentioned here, the simple answer is "No -we cannot always find a weight assignment that accurately reflects influence." A smallest counterexample is provided by the weighted game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1];
7 both the Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices assign to the heavy player exactly thrice the voting power of a light player. No weighted representation can assign that much weight to the heavy player, because her weight alone would then match that of the winning coalition consisting of the three light players, yet she does not, alone, form a winning coalition. Such an example demonstrates that the mismatch between weight and influence goes beyond what can be explained in terms of wiggle-room alone.
A follow-up question might then be:
QUESTION 1B: For which weighted voting rules does some choice of voting weights accurately reflect influence?
There is a small literature ( [7] , [20] , [21] , and [22] ) on "Penrose's limit theorem" (originally a conjecture of L. S. Penrose), showing that under certain circumstances, voting power tends to approximate voting weight when the number of voters is sufficiently large. With this important exception, however, 1B has received no attention in the literature, suggesting that it has not been seen as interesting. Our characterization of such rules (Section 6) in terms of spherical separability (for the Penrose-Banzhaf case) argues that that view might be up for revision. Question 2 (tying the matter of choosing a measure of voting power with that of designing a fair voting rule) is, of course, very broad -arguably, it lies behind almost every one of the many papers that have been written on voting power. For the reader interested in learning more about the measurement of voting power, we recommend the books by Felsenthal and Machover [10] and by Laruelle and Valenciano [17] .
Geometrization and hyperplane separation
Once we identify the set N of voters with an initial segment {1, 2, . . . , n} of natural numbers, each subset X ⊆ N corresponds to a characteristic vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) for which x i = 1 if i ∈ X and x i = 0 if not. Each such vector is boolean (it consists of 0s and 1s) and provides the coordinates of a vertex of the unit (hyper)cube in R n -the n-cube. In this way, we can label each n-cube vertex with a corresponding coalition of voters. In terms of Example 1 (sec.1), if we identify voters R, B, and G with the x, y, and z axes respectively, then we obtain the labeled 3-cube of Fig. 1 .
Notice that the shaded plane M of this figure, with equation x + y + 2z = 2.5, slices the cube so that winning coalitions are all strictly to one side of M and losing coalitions are all strictly to the other side -M is a separating hyperplane for the simple game G M ath of Example 1. 
8 A straightforward generalization of this example leads to the following: Theorem 3.1. A simple game is weighted if and only if the winning and losing coalitions can be strictly separated by a hyperplane. In particular, a vector is normal to some strictly separating hyperplane if and only if it serves as a vector of voting weights for the game.
While our minds are on Fig. 1 it seems appropriate to note a key relationship between the Hamming and Euclidean metrics for n-cube vertices -a very simple observation that we will need for our final characterization in Sec. 6. The Hamming distance between boolean vectors x and y is equal to number of coordinates at which the vectors differ: H(x, y) = |{i : x i = y i }|. For subsets X and Y of our voter set N , we will abuse terminology by using "Hamming distance between coalitions" or "H(X, Y )" to refer to the Hamming distance H(x, y) between their respective characteristic vectors, which coincides with the cardinality |X∆Y | of the coalitions' symmetric difference. For such characteristic vectors x, y the squared Euclidean distance x − y 2 is a sum of terms x i − y i 2 , each of which has value 0 (when x i = y i ) or 1 (when x i = y i ), and this sum has the same value as H(x, y): Proposition 3.2. Hamming distance between two coalitions equals squared Euclidean distance between their respective characteristic vectors: H(X, Y ) = x−y 2 .
Weighted Hamming distance and two characterizations of weighted voting
Throughout this section:
is a simple game 8 Weaker forms of hyperplane separation also do service in the mathematics of voting. Weak separability allows the hyperplane to intersect the two sets being separated, while neat separability demands that any such intersection be the same for both sets; these notions play roles in the theory of roughly weighted simple games (see [13] , [14] and [29] ), and of generalized scoring rules for multicandidate elections (see [5] , [30] and [31] ), respectively.
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• η = (η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η n ) is the vector of raw Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers for the voters of G • b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (the Hamming weights) • and w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (the voting weights). We will write w = ηb when w i = η i b i holds for each i. When E and F are subsets of N , their weighted Hamming distance is given by
F is a subset of N and V is a set of subsets of N we similarly define
We'll say that G is locally Hamming minimal via b if whenever E ∈ W, E / ∈ W, and W = W \ {E} ∪ {E } (W and W are "neighbors") we have
and that G is locally Hamming minimal if it is locally Hamming minimal via some vector b. The game G is tightly Hamming packed via b if every coalition in W is closer to W than is any coalition not in W -for every E ∈ W and E / ∈ W H b (W, E) < H b (W, E ) -and is tightly Hamming packed if it is tightly Hamming packed via some b. Our goal is the following theorem: Recalling that a simple game is weighted via weight vector w if and only if w(E ) < w(E) holds whenever E is a winning coalition and E is losing coalition, we see that proposition 4.2, in turn, follows immediately from:
Lemma 4.3. For G = (N, W) a simple game, E ∈ W, E / ∈ W, b any vector of Hamming weights, and w = ηb the corresponding vector of voting weights, 9 the following are equivalent:
9 While the reader should think of b and w as potential choices for Hamming weights and voting weights, respectively, we are not assuming in this preamble that they are good choices (that witness local Hamming minimality or tight Hamming packedness, or that provide a weighted representation for the game); the only actual assumption here is that their components are nonnegative reals, and that w = ηb.
The proof of lemma 4.3 will use the following: Definition 4.4. For G = (N, W) a simple game, and X ⊆ N :
Proof. For (i ) ⇔ (ii ): Let P = W \ {E} and W = P ∪ {E }, so that W and W are neighbors. Then
For (ii ) ⇔ (iii ):
Breaking each sum in four parts, this is equivalent to
Eliminating equal terms from both sides then yields
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For the next equivalent expression, we add equal quantities to both sides, getting
These sums collapse to
The "extra" term H b (E, E ) in the local Hamming minimality characterization (i) is disguised (if only lightly) in the characterization via tight packing; the sum H b (W, E) includes a term H b (E, E) that is zero, whereas the corresponding term
But where did the extra term go in the final equivalent condition (iii ): w(E ) < w(E)? The last few lines of the preceding proof suggest it has been completely absorbed into the choice of weight vector wif W and W were both weighted, then some alternative choice w of weight vector would make w (E) < w (E ). It seems that while the choice of w can thus absorb this extra term, b cannot fully do so, presumably because some information lies within the η i terms that are built in to w but not into b.
Euclidean distance and a theorem of Huyghens
A theorem due to Christiaan Huyghens (1629 -1695) is crucial in transforming the characterizations of the previous section into terms involving ellipsoids in Euclidean space. Huyghens (also spelled Huygens or Hugens) was a Dutch polymath and contemporary of Newton, known for inventing the pendulum clock, and proposing the wave theory of light, among other things. Our interest is in the following:
be a finite sequence of points in R d , q = r j=1 sj r be the mean location of the points of S, and y be any
Christiaan Huyghens, the astronomer, by Caspar Netscher (ca 1637 -1684) Fig. 2 illustrates the theorem for the case r = 3. Figure 2 . Huyghens' Theorem for three points in the plane. Notice that if each triangle yqs j in this figure were right (with right angle at q) then equation ( †) would follow immediately by applying the Pythagorean theorem separately to the triangles and adding the three resulting equations:
Of course, the triangles are not actually right, but the underlying idea is correct, as we'll see shortly.
First, however, we observe that the theorem has an intimate relationship with the following proposition, whose well-known proof we skip:
be a finite sequence of points in R d . Then the mean location q of the points of S is the point y in R d that minimizes the sum r j=1 y − s j 2 of squared Euclidean distances to the points of S.
We'll use 5.2 in the proof of Huyghens' theorem (5.1), but it also can be seen as a corollary of 5.1, as follows: the y that minimizes the left side of eqn.( †) is the one that minimizes the right side, by minimizing the distance from y to q. More important is that this same argument actually establishes a corollary of Huyghens' Theorem stronger than 5.2:
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Proof. Given any sequence U = {u i } r i=1 of r points in R d (with u j = (u j1 , . . . , u jd ) for each j) we will string their coordinates together, forming a single point
rd ; D will stand for the range of this function, a linear subspace of R rd .
Consider the triangle in R rd formed by the points s S , q⊗r, and y ⊗r, illustrated in Fig. 3 for the case r = 3. The angle at q⊗r is right, because we know (from Proposition 5.2) that, among points of D, q ⊗ r is closest to s S . The Pythagorean Theorem then asserts that Fig. 3 ). But this is the same as the desired conclusion ( †) of Huyghens' Theorem. 
Separation by aligned hyper-ellipsoids
We are interested in hyper-ellipsoids with equations having the form:
Here c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) is the ellipsoid's center, and b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ) determines the proportions. Such an ellipsoid is aligned -generated from a sphere by a series of uniform scalings along the coordinate axes. The ellipsoid is mean-centered with respect to G = (N, W) if its center coincides with the mean position q of all characteristic vectors for winning coalitions of G. In this setting, the ellipsoid separates the winning coalitions from the losing coalitions if all characteristic vectors of G's winning coalitions lie strictly within the ellipsoid, while all those of losing coalitions lie strictly outside (though we show later that these roles can be reversed).
When an aligned and mean-centered separating ellipsoid exists, G is ellipsoidally separable, and when that separating ellipsoid can be taken to be a sphere G is spherically separable. Our final characterization of weighted voting is then: For example, the game G M ath (Example 1) is spherically separable. Why place the center of the separating ellipsoid at the mean of the winning coalitions? With no restrictions on the center we could place it far away, and use an ellipsoid so large that the portion of its surface that lay within the ncube was arbitrarily close to a section of a plane. With this approach, ellipsoidal separability would immediately follow from separability via a hyperplane, and be of little interest.
Our proof of Theorem 6.1 fits together two earlier results: Proposition 3.2, stating that Hamming distance coincides with squared Euclidean distance, and our stronger Corollary 5.3 of Huyghens' Theorem, but requires that we first modify 3.2 so that it applies to weighted Hamming distance. Rather than change the Euclidean metric itself, we'll stretch the n-cube into a box with unequal sides, and apply the standard Euclidean metric as measured between vertices of this box.
Recall that for each coalition X ⊆ N , the corresponding characteristic vector x of 0s and 1s represents a vertex of the n-cube. Given a vector b of Hamming weights, let t be the vector t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) of square roots: t j = b j for each j. We'll write t = √ b, for short. For X ⊆ N , let x t = (x (1) w(E ) < w(E) (2) e t − q t < e t − q t .
Proof. w(E ) < w(E)
Further thoughts
These results suggest several avenues for future research. In presentations of this material, the most common audience response has been to ask, "Do these characterizations have analogous versions for the Shapley Shubik voting power index?" We do not know, but either answer might tell us something about the differences between the two power indices.
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Because our attention has been drawn here to the class of games for which the Penrose-Banzhaf voting powers can serve as voting weights, it seems natural to ask whether there are any other nice characterizations of this class. In particular, does the class have any normative interpretation -is there any sense in which games from this class are better choices for real voting rules, because they satisfy some desirable fairness property?
Fix some point y in space. Next, for each winning coalition X of some weighted game G, loop one end of an ideal rubber band 14 about x t and the other end about y. Finally, release y so that it seeks a position of equilibrium under the rubber band forces. This resulting position minimizes the potential energy P.E. = 1 2 X∈W x t − y 2 stored in the rubber bands. Proposition 5.2 implies that the equilibrium is at q t , the mean position of winning coalitions as located in the tbox. These ideas have been applied in [4] , in a very different voting context; there P.E. may be interpreted as the total discontent of the voters. For a broad collection of multi-candidate voting rules, the winning candidate can then be seen to be the minimizer of total discontent. It seems plausible that P.E. have some related interpretation for the yes-no type of voting we consider here.
